RESEARCHES IN INDIAN AND BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY

Essays in Honour of Professor Alex Wayman

Edited by
RAM KARAN SHARMA

MOTILAL BANARSIDASS PUBLISHERS
PRIVATE LIMITED • DELHI

First Edition: Delhi, 1993

© MOTILAL BANARSIDASS PUBLISHERS PRIVATE LIMITED
All Rights Reserved

ISBN: 81-208-0994-7

Also available at:
MOTILAL BANARSIDASS
41 U.A., Bungalow Road, Jawahar Nagar, Delhi 110 007
120 Royapettah High Road, Mylapore, Madras 600 004
16 St. Mark's Road, Bangalore 560 001
Ashok Rajpath, Patna 800 004
Chowk, Varanasi 221 001

PRINTED IN INDIA
BY JAINENDRA PRAKASH JAIN AT SHRI JAINENDRA PRESS, A-45 NARAINA NDUSTRIAL AREA, PHASE I, NEW DELHI 110 028 AND PUBLISHED BY NARENDRA PRAKASH JAIN FOR MOTILAL BANARSIDASS PUBLISHERS PRIVATE LIMITED, BUNGALOW ROAD, JAWAHAR NAGAR, DELHI 110 007

CONTENTS

Preface vii
Emeneau's Blessings xi
Biographical Sketch of Alex Wayman xiii
Bibliography xxiii

BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHICAL RESEARCHES

A. MISCELLANEOUS

1. The List of the *Asaṃskṛta-dharma* According to Asaṅga ANDRÉ BAREAU
2. The Seven Principles of the Vajjian Republic: Their Different Interpretations HAJIME NAKAMURA 7
3. A Difficult Beginning: Comments on an English Translation of Candragomin's *Deśanāstava* MICHAEL HAHN 31
4. A Study of Aspects of *Rāga* N. H. SAMTANI 61

B. KARMA THEORY

5. Principle of Life According to Bhavya SHINJO KAWASAKI 69
6. The Buddhist Doctrine of Karma HARI SHANKAR PRASAD 83
7. A Critical Appraisal of Karmaphalaparīkṣā of Nāgārjuna T. R. SHARMA 97

C. DEPENDENT ORIGINATION

8. The Relationship between *Paṭiccasamuppāda* and *Dhātu* AKIRA HIRAKAWA 105
9. Dependent Origination: Its Elaboration in Early Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma Texts COLLETT COX 19
10. Dependent Origination in Buddhist Tantra GEORGE R. ELDER 143

JAINA PHILOSOPHICAL RESEARCHES

11. (*Kevali*) *Bhuktivicāra* of Bhāvasena: Text and Translation PADMANABH S. JAINI 163

12. The Earliest Portions of *Daśavaikālika-sūtra*
M.A. DHAKY 79

HINDU PHILOSOPHICAL RESEARCHES

13. Buddhist and Mīmāṃsā Views on Lakṣaṇā
K. KUNJUNNI RAJA 195

14. Grammarians and Philosophers
KAMALESWAR BHATTACHARYA

15. Kashmir Śaivism (KS) and the Vedānta of Śaṅkara R.C. DWIVEDI

16. Siddhi-s in the Bhāgavata Purāṇa and in the Yogasūtra-s of Patañjali—A Comparison
T. S. RUKMANI

17. Language and Metaphor in Indian Stotra Literature R. K. SHARMA 227

18. *Pitta* Versus *Agni*—An Ayurvedic Perspective
BHAGWAN DASH 241

19. The Doctrine of 'Aham-Artha' R.V. JOSHI 247

Contributors 281

PREFACE

It is preeminently fit for the scholarly world to bring out a Felicitation volume to honour Professor Alex Wayman, who has distinguished himself by an outpouring of scholarly works on Buddhism for almost forty years; and who is now Professor of Sanskrit, emeritus, Columbia University, New York.

I am proud of my association with Professor Wayman dating back to 1957 as my distinguished satīrthya when I joined the University of California, Berkeley, as a Fulbright student. There we both studied under Professor Murray Barnson Emeneau, an eminent linguist, classicist and Indologist; and then were awarded our Ph.D.'s the same date in 1959.

Prof. Wayman has been all along a source of inspiration to me. He identifies himself with his studies in an exclusive attention always occupied with scholarly pursuits, finishing one thing, and thinking of his next project. I don't remember if he ever talked of anything other than Indian Philosophy, Buddhism or general Indology.

Prof. Emeneau's kind blessings are found in print in this volume. Those of Prof. R.N. Dandekar and other distinguished members of the Felicitation Committee are also very much there: "punaś ca bhūyo 'pi namo 'stu tebhyaḥ".

I am grateful to the Felicitation Committee and also to the learned contributors for enriching this volume. It is divided into three major sections: Buddhist, Jaina and Hindu Philosophical Researches. In a way this is also the scope of Professor Wayman's researches.

Under the Buddhist researches, the essay by André Bareau, using the Vinaya in Chinese, defends Wayman's position that Asaṅga belonged to the Mahīśāsaka sect. Hajime Nakamura points out differing views, about the seven Vajjian Republic principles; it is nice to have this important set of paragraphs in the present volume. Michael Hahn concerns himself with the famous Buddhist poet Candragomin who might also be the grammarian of that name but hardly the Candragomin who commented on Buddhist Tantras. N.H. Samtani vigorously treats the term *rāga*. After these miscellaneous articles there are

19 THE DOCTRINE OF 'AHAM-ARTHA'

R. V. JOSHI, *Delhi*

The followers of Advaita and Vaiṣṇava Vedānta categorically differ on this doctrine. The Advaitin explains 'aham-artha' or 'I-sense' in five ways:

(i) that ego (ahaṁkāra) is 'I-sense'.
(ii) that consciousness reflected in conscience* is 'I-sense'.
(iii) that consciousness conditioned by conscience in the form of ego is 'I-sense'.
(iv) that the uniting element of animate and inanimate (cit-acit-granthi) is 'I-sense'. It amounts to that ego-consciousness (ahaṁkāra-caitanya) modified by identical super-imposition (tādātmya-adhyāsa) is 'I-sense'.
(v) that pure consciousness is not 'I-sense'.

The Advaitin declares the ego of Sāṁkhya as 'I-sense' but rejects the Sāṁkhya theory of creation. This stand is not logical. Even if we accept for the sake of argument that the Advaitin does not disagree with the Sāṁkhya theory of creation, the ego as propounded in non-dualism does differ from the ego of Sāṁkhya, because the ego in non-dualism is different in each individual 'Self' while the ego in Sāṁkhya is not different in each individual 'Self'. The Sāṁkhya accepts a threefold ego of the nature of (i) a pure ego associated with goodness and virtue (sāttvika) (ii) a dynamic ego with passion and pride (rājasika) and (iii) an ego as experienced in ignorance and inertia (tāmasika).[1] Nevertheless, the ego in Sāṁkhya is not destroyed during profound repose or dreamless sleep of an individual, otherwise the ego of every individual will simultaneously be destroyed. Therefore, the ego of Sāṁkhya and the ego of Vedānta are not identical.

The Non-dualist accepts 'I-ness' (ahantva) in ego and not in

*In a later passage it appears that the author uses the word 'conscience' for the *antaḥkaraṇa* (Ed.).

'Self', otherwise on account of 'I-ness' the pure 'Self' will become qualified (saviśeṣa) and in that case the attribute 'I-ness' will have to be accepted in 'Self'. When 'I-ness' is accepted in 'Self', all individual 'Selves' will be understood as 'I' (aham) because—'Self' is one without a second. Our normal experience in life is however different. We understand individual 'Self' by 'This', 'That', 'You' and 'He' and not in the form of 'I'. The objection is untenable so far as Sāṁkhya is concerned because in Sāṁkhya all 'Puruṣa' are different from each other. 'Puruṣa' in Sāṁkhya is without any modification (nirvikāra) but not without attributes (nirdharmaka). As such there is no defect in Sāṁkhya in accepting 'I-ness' in 'self',[2] while the Non-dualist accepts 'I-ness' in ego and not in 'self'.[3]

Let us first examine the non-dualistic view that conscience is ego and ego is 'I-sense'. In non-dualism the sāttvika part of five elements as a result of nescience, produces conscience divided into (i) mind (manas), (ii) intellect (buddhi), (iii) ego (ahaṁkāra) and (iv) citta (mind stuff). A close perusal of the theory of creation in Vedic and Paurāṇic cosmology and the theory of creation in the Mokṣadharma parva of the Śānti parva of the Mahābhārata indicates that conscience of non-dualism and mind of the Upaniṣads are equivalent terms.[4] Mind is considered as endowed with several functions such as volition (saṁkalpa), determination (adhyavasāya), desire or feeling (abhimāna), thinking, contemplation, faith and knowing.[5]

The Paurāṇic point of view that mind and senses originate from pure egotism associated with goodness and virtue (sāttvika ahaṁkāra) does not agree with the non-dualistic view wherein mind originates from pure parts (sāttvika aṁśa) of five elements. We come across several non-dualistic Sanskrit texts saying that the principle of intelligence is the ego, or an ego-element originating from the principle of intelligence is the ego. The Non-dualist maintains that the conscience, originating from five elements, is ego.

The materialistic school of Cārvāka maintains the existence of 'I-sense' till death, while the Advaita Vedānta maintains that 'I-sense' is destroyed and produced in each sleep and awaking. 'I-sense' is different day by day in each individual. By the time one and the same 'I-sense' continues to exist in an individual 'Self' in Cārvāka system, thousands of 'I-sense' are produced in

another individual 'Self' in non-dualism. Therefore the Non-dualist cannot maintain one and the same form of 'Self' till liberation.

The Non-dualist solves this problem stating that although the ego, a product of nescience, is destroyed during profound repose, it continues to exist in causal form.[6] The causal form of the ego, obviously, could not be nescience because nescience could never be the direct cause of conscience because Non-dualist accepts conscience as a product of five elements. This helps us to prove that either ego or five elements could be the causal form of ego. Nescience is certainly not the causal form of ego.

The destruction of 'I-sense' during profound repose creates another difficulty. In case in non-dualism 'I-sense' is destroyed in each profound repose of an individual 'Self' and a new 'I-sense' is produced, the Non-dualist should accept that all impressions of our experience stored in sub-conscious mind are also destroyed along with the destruction of the first 'I-sense' and the awakened man could not remember his past experience considering himself identical with the former 'I-sense'.

It may be argued that in the profound repose ego remains merged in the causal nescience and the ego—impression resides on the support of nescience. In the awaking state this very nescience transforms itself into conscience and the impressions remain in conscience on the support of nescience. Thus the newly created ego recalls the objects of experience of the former ego.

The reasoning is fallacious. We may agree that the second ego may recollect the objects of experience of the first ego but we cannot agree that both these egos are identical. We do experience the identity of the two egos of yesterday and today. This proves that 'I-sense' is not destroyed during profound repose. Secondly, when in non-dualism ego of all individual 'Selves' is destroyed in dreamless sleep and all impressions remain in causal nescience, naturally a question arises how these impressions reach a particular individual ego of a 'Self' from this causal nescience. To accept innumerable egos of innumerable 'Selves' as an entirely new creation from one causal nescience will create another difficulty. Impressions residing in a particular ego on the previous day would reach any ego the next morning, travelling through nescience during dreamless sleep. As a result

'X' should be able to remember the objects of the experience of 'Y' because when 'X' and 'Y' are awakened all new egos are similar before the multitude of impressions residing in causal nescience and there would be no regulator to carry a certain group of impressions to a particular ego where this group did reside on the previous day.

The Non-dualist may argue that in spite of the fact that nescience is one, there is some partial difference in nescience. Therefore, during dreamless sleep, ego at the time of merging itself in nescience, places its own impressions in a certain part of nescience. The next morning these very impressions automatically reach that very ego when the same ego is produced from that very part of nescience. To avoid this indirect process of merger and production, the Vaiṣṇava Vedānta proposes the identity of 'I-sense' and 'Self' in lieu of presumed innumerable parts of nescience. It is an easier [conception] than the merger and production of different egos in different parts of nescience due to which the relevant centres carry the impressions to their own receptacles.

It will not be correct to interpret the Upaniṣadic text: 'Then the father is no father, mother is no mother, the worlds no worlds and Gods no Gods'[7] in the sense of absolute negation of external world during profound repose because in reality the external world does continue to exist. The closing of the eyes of a pigeon towards an attacking cat does not negate the existence of cat. What the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* exactly means in this context is this that one becomes completely unaware of the external world in the state of profound repose. The negation is just in the figurative sense. Likewise, all Śruti texts appearing to interpret the merger of ego during profound repose should be taken in the figurative sense that therein ego continues to exist. During awaking, one experiences; 'I am fat'; 'I am a man'; 'I am a woman'. Such experience depends on the intellect arising from ego.

The Śāṅkara Bhāṣya on the Brahmasūtra indicates that intellect has the minutest size in the distinguishing property of 'Self'[8] and this limiting adjunct relation of 'Self' and intellect having no beginning exists till liberation.[9] Intellect as a potential exists in the states of profound repose and deluge.[10] Conscience, a limiting adjunct of 'Self' is designated by several terms such as

mind, intellect, ego and mind stuff.[11] The testimony of the *Brahmasūtra Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya* postulates that only that could be accepted as a limiting adjunct of 'Self' which exists even in profound repose and deluge. It therefore becomes the demand of propriety that such a limiting adjunct is accepted as an object of 'I-Intellect' or the feeling of 'I' (aham-buddhi) because this limiting adjunct is nothing else but nescience. Consequently, conscience is 'I-sense'. The merger of ego during profound repose is the secondary meaning. In fact, only the operational function of ego ceases during profound repose and not ego itself. The negation is of functions such as volition, desire, feeling or determination. This proves that the acceptance of the merger of the distinguishing property of 'Self' during dreamless sleep is inconsistent with the viewpoint of the *Śāṅkara Bhāṣya*. Even if it be argued that all intellects in the form of the distinguishing property of 'Self' are not identical with nescience, we cannot afford not to accept that all conditioned intellects are different from each other and have no beginning at all. At the same time the Non-dualist will be forced to accept the destruction of these conditioned intellects at the time of the deluge. The non-dualistic view that the merger of the limiting adjunct of the 'Self' and the negation of 'I-sense' in the state of profound repose does not hold good.

The uniting element of animate and inanimate in not 'I-sense'

Madhusūdana Sarasvatī has explained in the 16th century in his *Advaita-Siddhi* that 'I-sense' means uniting the elements of animate and inanimate (cit-acit-granthi). This Sanskrit term has been interpreted as an intricate knot. It makes one commit errors after errors. The darkness extends. One thinks that he knows many things, while he remains most ignorant of what he is most assured of. The bondage and attraction of 'I-ness' and 'Mine-ness', and the repulsion of separateness or otherness, hostility, very curiously make him restless. He hangs oscillately between them.[12] The Sanskrit term includes animate or consciousness or the principle of universal intelligence by the word 'cit' and inanimate (conscience) by the word 'acit'. This very 'I-sense' is known as ego when we have the apprehension of 'I'. 'I-sense' of the nature of ego having the idea of the apprehension of 'I' or 'I experience' is the substratum of 'Self' (cit). From the

apprehension 'I am the performer', 'I-sense' appears as the substratum of the state of being the performer (kartṛttva) etc. attributes residing in conscience (acit). This should not be understood as simple mutual relationship between animate and inanimate but there exists mutual identical superimposition (tādātmya-adhyāsa) between the two. This very uniting element of consciousness and conscience appearing identical due to misapprehension is known as 'I-sense'. Hence 'I-sense' and ego are identical.[13]

This interpretation of 'I-sense' is questionable. One may enquire what is exactly meant by 'uniting element'. Does it represent the nature of animate and inanimate? Or, does it represent the superiority of one over another? The second question is what is the cause of the activity of 'I' (pravṛtti-nimitta). Neither consciousness nor ego could be accepted as the cause of the activity of 'I' because we do not find usage of the word 'I' in this sense. Our normal experience is that everybody uses the word 'I' keeping in mind 'I-ness' as the cause of the activity of 'I'. The meaning of the word 'I' as either consciousness qualified by ego or ego qualified by consciousness does not appear appropriate because in that case we would be bound to accept the relation of qualification and qualified (viśeṣaṇaviśeṣya-bhāva saṁbandha). This sort of relation cannot be accepted simply because there does not exist the relation of difference or non-difference. In the former case the consciousness of difference will continue to exist and an identical super-imposition would be an impossibility. In the latter case it would be necessary to accept mutual super-imposition otherwise it would be going against the non-dualistic school of Vedānta. Truly, by accepting the relation of qualification and qualified through the relation of non-difference the consciousness can manifest ego but it must not be forgotten that an ego could never manifest consciousness according to non-dualism wherein consciousness is without any attribute (nirdharmaka). One might insist that an ego would appear to be associated with consciousness but in that case one would immediately differentiate ego from consciousness and super-imposition would be impossible. If the idea of the Non-dualist is to suggest the appearance of consciousness along with the attribute 'I-sense' of the ego, the Non-dualist indirectly agrees that 'I-ness', the cause of the activity of 'I', is a property

of the ego and in that case 'You-sense' of an ego would not be acceptable in non-dualism. It is noteworthy that the meaning of an ego as 'You-sense' is also accepted in non-dualism because it is meant for another (parārtha). In fact, the ego accomplishes the purpose of consciousness. One will not fail to note that the attributes such as 'the state of being the performer and enjoyer' are admitted in an ego according to non-dualism and not in undifferentiated consciousness through an ego. It would therefore be against the non-dualistic view to hold that consciousness appears along 'I-ness' of ego. Ego is not meant for another and as such does not yield the idea of 'You-sense'. The idea of identical super-imposition of ego and consciousness is not correct because we all feel 'I, the sentient perform'. In such experience ego appears as the locus of consciousness and super-imposition of consciousness remains impossible. The difference between ego and consciousness is obviously proved on the basis of the relation of container and contained.

It would not be out of place to examine the meaning of two 'aham' words, viz. (i) aham, indeclinable ending in 'm' (ii) aham, declined from the noun 'asmat' or 'asmad' in nominative singular ending in 't' or 'd'. The primary sense of both these words has been accepted by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in the Advaita-siddhi as ego. Neither of the two denotes the sense of 'Self' in the tradition of Advaita Vedānta. To determine the meaning we should take into account the authority of Sanskrit grammar. The *Kāśikā-Vṛtti* and the *Padamañjarī* on the aphorism of Pāṇini 'ahaṁ Śubhayor yus' (5.2.40) clearly indicate that one 'aham' is an indeclinable representing the inflection of nouns (vibhakti pratirūpaka avyaya), while the second 'aham' is declined from the noun 'asmad' by the substitute 'aha'. Both the words apparently appearing as identical are not identical so far as their meaning is concerned.[14] The indeclinable 'aham' denotes the sense of ego, and the declined 'aham' the sense of 'Self'. To take these two words as synonyms would mean to violate the rules of Pāṇini grammar. The non-dualist view is not correct because ego has nowhere been accepted in the sense of the uniting element of animate and inanimate.

I may refer to the *Śāṅkara Bhāṣya* that conscience, viz. mind, intellect, ego and ego stuff has four mental functions: doubt, right knowledge, slumber and remembrance respectively.[15] The

evidence shows that ego going with egotism or pride is one of the four aspects of conscience. Ego cannot go with any other remaining three functions. To accept the identical sense of all the above-mentioned four words would mean that the word 'asmad' could be used with any of the four functions and ego could be applied to any of the four on the ground of the uniting element of animate and inanimate. Since such is not the position, the uniting element of animate and inanimate cannot be accepted as the meaning of 'I-sense'. To elaborate it further we may take an example of the statement, I am fat, there is an apprehension of the egoistic feeling of 'Self' on the inanimate substratum such as body but we do not have any idea of gross ego. Therefore the meaning of ego and the meaning of the declined 'Aham' word is not one and the same. The indeclinable 'aham' always remains in the same form, while the declined 'aham' has this form only in nominative singular. In accusative and genitive, the forms of 'asmad' are 'mām' and 'mama' respectively. There is no proof to establish the identical meaning of the two 'aham' words. On the other hand, we have authority of Sanskrit grammar and dictionary regarding the meaning of the indeclinable 'aham' in the sense of ego or egotism and the declined 'aham', 'mām' and 'mama' denote an altogether different sense and that sense is 'Self'. The non-dualistic view of the uniting element of animate and inanimate as 'I-sense' is not correct on the ground that all statements such as 'I, the sentient, perform the action and enjoy' prove an existence of consciousness in 'I-sense'.

Existence of 'I-sense' in Suṣupti

The Sanskrit word Suṣupti denotes the sense of profound repose or dreamless sleep. It has been explained by Śaṅkarācārya as spiritual ignorance.[16] It has already been observed that according to non-dualism 'I-sense' is different from 'Self'. Now, let me remind that 'I-sense' of the nature of 'I' does exist in the states of awaking and dream but does not exist in the states of profound repose and liberation, while the eternal 'Self' exists in all these three states. This is the contention of the Non-dualist. The Non-dualist argues that had there been 'I-sense' during profound repose, one would have had the idea of 'I'. Since we never have the idea of 'I' during profound repose, there is non-existence of 'I-sense'. Likewise, had 'I-sense' been existent in the

state of liberation, ignorance would continue to exist. There is of course no possibility of ignorance in liberation. Therefore, non-existent 'I-sense', in the states of profound repose and liberation, is not the internal 'Self'. Consciousness existing in both these states is considered as 'Self' in Advaita Vedānta.

It has been made clear that according to Advaita Vedānta 'I-sense' is of the nature of 'I' i.e. the uniting element of animate and inanimate. The concept includes the sentient 'Self' as the insentient conscience of the nature of ego. There is mutual identical super-imposition between conscience and ego. During the apprehension of 'I' one has the idea of ego as identical with consciousness and of consciousness as identical with ego. This very uniting element of mutual identical super-imposition between consciousness and ego is accepted as 'I-sense' in Advaita Vedānta. It is noteworthy in this connection that in non-dualism the super-imposition of ego on consciousness is direct. It is only after this super-imposition that the attributes such as performer and enjoyer existing in conscience of the nature of ego become imposed. Nevertheless, this superimposition of ego on consciousness has no limiting adjunct while the super-imposition of the attributes on consciousness is limited by the adjuncts. Since ego by its very nature exists in the states of awaking and dream, we experience 'I' but in the state of profound repose it exists in the form of causal nescience and therefore we do not experience its existence. In the state of liberation, nescience, the material cause of the ego, is destroyed and the ego ceases to exist either by its own form or by causal form. Thus in liberation there is no possibility of existence of the ego at all.

The Viśiṣṭādvaita school of Rāmānuja maintains that 'I-sense' is 'Self'. Ego is not included in 'I-sense'. 'Self' without ego is 'I-sense'. 'I-sense' exists in the states of profound repose and liberation. In case 'I-sense' is non-existent during profound repose, Rāmānujist argues, one would be forced to accept two different 'I-sense' viz. (i) 'I-sense', existing in the awaking and dream states on the previous day (ii) 'I-sense' existing in awakening after sleep. This would amount to that the second 'I-sense' would not be able to remember the objects experienced by the first 'I-sense'. This is our normal experience that he who experiences certain things in life remembers them in the future. It is an absolute impossibility that the first 'I-sense' experiences and

the second remembers. Otherwise, the experience of 'X' would be remembered by 'Y'. It is therefore more reasonable to accept only one 'I-sense'. We notice the common experience as follows: I, who performed certain actions, am now performing this action'. This recollection supports the identical characteristics of the two 'I-sense'. One and the same 'I-sense' exists in the dormant condition during profound sleep and continues to exist during sleep and after sleep.[17]

It may be questioned that if an 'I-sense' exists during profound repose, why do we not experience it and why does it not become as object of our experience. Since it is never experienced during profound repose, it would be more appropriate to accept its non-existence. The simple logic is that happiness, unhappiness and 'I-sense' manifest by the way of experience only so long they exist. It is self-contradictory to maintain that they exist but do not become the object of our experience. The view of Rāmānuja school finds strong support of Naiyāyika who declares that 'Self' of the nature of 'I-sense' remains unmanifest in dreamless sleep.

There is no such rule that all existing objects must become the object of our perception. There are several such objects which exist and are not perceived. 'I-sense' can also exist remaining unmanifest. The argument that by nature 'I-sense' should manifest so long it exists is untenable because according to Advaita Vedānta too 'I-sense' exists in the most subtle form and remains unmanifest. In fact, wherever there is some function of internal or external senses, we experience 'I-sense'. If it is argued that the first individual 'I-sense' is the substratum of the 'I-ness' of the second individual 'I-sense' and therefore the second individual 'I' understands the 'I' of the first individual, then the subtle form could also be accepted as the substratum of 'I-ness'. This would be an additional proof for the existence of 'I-sense' during profound repose.

The outstanding proof of the existence of 'I-sense' during profound repose is recollection. For instance, one recollects: 'I, who performed such and such actions yesterday, am now awakened after sound sleep'. This experience attests the identity of yesterday's and today's individual 'I-sense' and its existence during profound repose. Truly, there is no experience during the state of profound repose because the attributive consciousness is

contracted. The profound repose can only become the object of inferential knowledge after awakening from sleep.

The contention of the Non-dualist is that 'I-sense' is destroyed during profound repose but consciousness and nescience however exist. Any one of these two could be the locus of the impressions which are in fact the cause of memory after dreamless sleep. It is not at all necessary to accept the existence of 'I-sense' during profound repose for the sake of remembering the previously experienced objects.

The argument is not a strong one. First, there is no proof to hold that consciousness of the nature of nescience exists during profound sleep. It cannot be proved that knowledge and ignorance coexist during profound repose. Both cannot coexist in the absence of the knower; it may be kept in mind that the Non-dualist further accepts the non-existence of the knower 'I-sense' in profound repose. Then how can knowledge and ignorance coexist in the absence of knower. Our common experience (i) 'I know' (ii) 'I do not know' prove that 'I-sense' is the substratum of knowledge and ignorance. Besides, consciousness and ignorance cannot be accepted as a receptacle of the impressions. It is only 'I-sense' which is the locus of the impressions. The other point is also refuted that 'I-sense-ego' is destroyed during dreamless sleep but it exists as causal nescience—the substratum of impressions, on the ground that when nescience is considered as locus of impressions, nescience would also become the knower. The Non-dualist will thus have no alternative but to accept nescience as a knower and the ego will not be reckoned as a knower because the ego cannot recall impressions belonging to nescience.

In this way on the basis of the experience of recollection the identity of the 'I-sense' of yesterday and the 'I-sense' of today is established beyond doubt. The existence of the 'I-sense' during profound repose is automatically proved. In the case when there is absence of an 'I-sense' during profound repose, the 'I-sense' —the locus of impressions is destroyed, one cannot recall any impressions at all. For want of proof, therefore, consciousness and nescience cannot be accepted as the substratum of impressions. Similarly, consciousness without any modification (nirvikāra) and without any special characteristic (nirviśeṣa) cannot become the locus of impressions. We have already noticed that

nescience could neither become the locus of impressions otherwise it will be the knower. Therefore, the only plausible proposition is that of Vaiṣṇava Vedānta that the 'I-sense' exists during profound repose. Both the logicians and the followers of the qualified non-dualistic school of Vedānta (Rāmānuja) maintain this view. The only difference between these two philosophical traditions is that when the logician (Naiyāyika) does not accept the manifestation of the 'I-sense' during dreamless profound sleep but simply recognises its existence, the followers of the qualified non-dualism accept both the existence as well as the manifestation of 'I-sense' during profound repose.

Existence of 'I-sense' in the state of liberation

I now proceed to examine whether 'I-sense' exists in the state of liberation. It may be kept in mind that the school of Advaita Vedānta totally rejects the existence of 'I-sense' in liberation. The Viśiṣṭādvaita school of Vedānta, however, maintains the existence as well as the manifestation of 'I-sense' in the state of liberation on the basis of the authority of the Śruti texts;

(a) 'I shall obtain it after my transition from this world.'[18]

(b) 'Like unto the moon which escapes from the mouth of Rāhu, I shall purify myself, my body, and, become free (by the aid of meditation) verily, attain—the uncreated Brahmaloka.'[19]

The above cited quotations denote an intensive desire of one who is desirous of liberation. The quoted text proves that liberation is definitely related to 'I-sense' of one who desires liberation. The main purport of the text is that we are all an object of enjoyment of the 'Supreme Self' as an object of enjoyment.[20]

The Taittirīya Upaniṣad further states:

(i) 'Rasam hyevāyaṁ labdhvā ānandī bhavati' (for any one obtaining taste becomes delighted). II.7.1.

(ii) 'Eṣa hyeva ānadayati' (for it is He (the Supreme Self) that fills with bliss). Ibid.

The textual authority supports that blissful Supreme Self alone bestows bliss and one attains bliss by realising Supreme Self of the nature of sentiment (Rasa).

A large number of such Upaniṣadic texts teaches us that in the state of liberation one does attain the inexhaustible bliss and that

one should not leave any stone unturned to get rid of the bondage of all the three miseries of the mundane world. It is only with this goal in mind that one adopts the listening, cognitive and repeated meditation etc. as means of realisation. Noteworthy is the fact that Non-dualist does also agree to the cessation of all the miseries and the attainment of unsurpassed bliss of the 'Supreme Self' in the state of liberation. Had such bliss been not manifest in liberation, its attaining had little sense. But in case such bliss becomes manifest to a liberated 'Self', he must experience as follows: 'I am enjoying the bliss', 'I am endowed with bliss'.

It may be argued that to accept the 'I-sense' and its manifestation in the state of liberation would amount to accept the 'Self' as ignorant and transmigratory in the state of liberation, on the simple logic that so long as there is the 'I-sense', the 'Self' is ignorant and transmigratory. Therefore, it would be more appropriate to accept, the Non-dualist says, ego as 'I-sense' which does not exist in liberation. Here an objection can be raised against the Non-dualist view which maintains the existence and manifestation of 'Cognition-Self' (saṁvid Ātman) in the state of liberation as that would likewise mean the coexistence of ignorance and transmigration in liberation if cognition continues to exist. The followers of non-dualism however advocate that only the incongruous manifestation of a 'cognition-Self' is pervaded by ignorance, and only in the state of transmigration does incongruous manifestation exist. Hence, there is ignorance only in transmigration, I may mention, in this connection, that both the existence and the manifestation of an 'I-sense' in liberation are not pervaded by ignorance and transmigration. It is only an incongruous manifestation opposed to the real nature of 'I-sense' which becomes pervaded by ignorance and transmigration. In fact, the false nature is not manifest in liberation. Only the real nature in the form of 'I-sense' becomes manifest.

The contention of Advaita Vedānta, that 'I-sense' is ego and that it ceases to exist in the state of liberation, while the 'attributeless Self' of the nature of consciouness continues to exist, does not hold good. It would be more rational to admit 'I-sense' as 'self' and its existence in liberation rather than accepting 'I-sense' as ego and negating its existence in liberation. Otherwise no sensible person would adopt to the austere means in order to attain liberation because the moment he understands that he is

identical with that ego which will discontinue who would like to negate one's own existence. So long as the Non-dualist accepts the existence of a subtle ego in liberation, one may adopt the means in order to liberate oneself, but when the complete negation of an 'I-sense' in the state of liberation is accepted, who would give an ear to the scriptures blowing the trumpets of liberation.[21]

It may be advocated by the 'Non-dualist' at this stage that the 'I-sense' of the nature of ego does not distinguish between 'cognition-Self' and itself. It misapprehends itself as non-different from 'cognition-Self'. The answer is not satisfactory because the 'I-sense' of the nature of ego regards itself as non-different from the 'cognition-Self' on account of misapprehension. Then it certainly understands the reality of its existence in the state of liberation. As such it should further believe in discontinuation of cognition in liberation, i.e. the cognition with which it earlier felt its own identity. To say that by misapprehending the existence of 'I-sense' of the nature of ego one would believe one's own existence in liberation is not logical. The simple reason is that he who believes his existence in liberation by misapprehension has not in reality understood the real nature of liberation. Besides, in non-dualism the complete destruction of nescience and ego is the concept of liberation. Non-dualist argues that one activates oneself to the means of liberation on the misapprehension of the idea of the continuance of 'I-sense' in liberation but in fact in his view 'I-sense' is destroyed as soon as the knowledge of non-dualism appears. This would remind us of an analogy of a person desirous to attain final liberation of the nature of bliss suddenly finding his head cut into pieces. Therefore, this type of liberation of the nature of the destruction of ego could never be accepted as the goal of life.[22]

The Non-dualist further postulates that being afflicted by the threefold miseries of the mundane world to which all mortals are subject, the individual 'Self' might consider that so long as there exists the sense of 'I-ness', it is impossible to get rid of the miseries,[23] and therefore one must destroy oneself, i.e. with destruction of 'I-sense'. Thus considering one's own destruction one would adopt the means of liberation and the destruction of 'I-sense' thus desirable.

The above view is rejected on the basis of the following Śruti

texts which declare that the knower of the 'Supreme Self' becomes 'Supreme Self' and that the liberated Self knows all knowable. The Upaniṣadic evidence proves the existence of 'I-sense' as of the nature of knower. The textual passages in support are as follows:

1. 'One passes beyond death only after realising Him. There is no other way to escape from the circle of birth and death.'[24]
2. 'Whoever knows the 'Supreme Brahman becomes even Brahman.'[25]
3. 'That man who knows this confronts not death nor disease nor does he meet with pain or suffering. He observes everything, and attains everything in every way'.... Truly the knower of 'Self' becomes 'Self'.[26]

The above cited Śruti text clearly declares that the direct knowledge of the Supreme Self is the best means to attain immortality. In case 'I-sense' is destroyed in the state of liberation as accepted in non-dualism, the direct knowledge of the Supreme Self will become the cause of death because the knower ego will perish. This will contradict the Śruti tradition. To avoid this inconsistency it is better to accept that the 'I-sense' exists in the state of liberation.

Furthermore in non-dualism the 'attributeless cognition' is regarded as the 'Self' and that in the states of knowing and thinking etc., attributes do not exist in 'attributeless cognition'. In addition to this, the 'Self' is regarded as eternally liberated. This is a self-contradictory view because in the absence of the states of the knowing and thinking etc. attributes, the 'Self' could not listen to the scriptures or contemplate upon 'Supreme Self'; and so why would the eternally liberated attributeless cognition-Self desire liberation at all. One may argue that in the states of knowing and thinking, etc. attributes are super-imposed on the eternally liberated attributeless cognition-Self, and therefore one becomes desirous of liberation considering oneself unhappy due to misapprehension and likewise becomes a listener and thinker when there is super-imposition of the states of knowing and thinking.

I am inclined to mention that in the above discussion the standpoint of non-dualism is perhaps not correctly represented. In reality in non-dualism superimposition is a function (*vṛtti*)—

an attribute of conscience. Therefore, conscience may be deemed a listener, thinker, happy or unhappy and not the 'Self' of the nature of knower. It is not possible to prove that a 'Self' of the nature of cognition is entitled to liberation. It would be further incorrect to say that the knower 'I-sense' activates the 'cognition Self' to liberation on the simple ground that an 'I-sense' would not adopt any means of liberation as that would amount to its own destruction, and that such an activity of an 'I-sense' would be compared to the activity of a person who is desirous to cut off his own head in order to save the life of his beloved wife from death and who has been declared hopeless by the medical experts. Similarly, even if the 'Self' is liberated, the non-existent 'I-sense' in the state of liberation would not get any reward of his activity. It must, therefore, be admitted that the 'I-sense' does exist in the state of liberation and only then could there be some possibility of the right to liberation.

In order to justify the non-dualistic point of view it is generally explained that according to non-dualism conscience is four fold. The word 'I' does not simply mean conscience of the nature of ego but it stands for the consciousness conditioned by conscience. Therefore, consciousness conditioned by conscience is 'I-sense' (i.e. antaḥkaraṇâvacchinna caitanya is aham-artha). In the state of liberation in spite of the destruction of the attributive conscience or ego, the consciousness continues to exist. As such there is no inconsistency in non-dualism and with the desire 'I would like to be liberated' this very consciousness conditioned by conscience activates the means of liberation such as listening to the religious discourses and reading the religious scriptures. The reasoning of the Non-dualist does not remain good at the examination on the touchstone of the following argument. One may enquire who makes efforts for liberation with such a pre-desire, i.e. 'I-the bound, would like to be liberated by such and such actions'. Is it conscience or consciousness? In the former case it would be a fruitless effort so far as conscience is concerned because conscience would itself be destroyed in the state of liberation. In the latter case the consciousness cannot be regarded as the locus of activity since it is considered as attributeless in the tradition of Advaita Vedânta.

The Non-dualist further makes an attempt to support his point of view on the following three arguments:

(a) There is superimposition of the locus of the activity and conscience-identity on consciousness.

(b) Ego, by superimposing its identity on consciousness, regards itself as the substratum of activity.

(c) Ego, on account of its identical superimposition on the 'attributeless consciousness' regards consciousness as the 'substratum of the activity'—is erroneous knowledge. The object of this erroneous knowledge is consciousness. To be such an object is the bondage of consciousness, and in the state of liberation the consciousness becomes liberated from the activity of the false knowledge. The bondage and liberation in connection with consciousness are not inconsistent.

All these arguments can be easily refuted:

(a) According to the non-dualism superimposition is a function of conscience. Naturally its substratum will be conscience and not consciousness. Therefore, it would not be correct to maintain consciousness as the locus of the activity.

(b) The substratum of bondage is ego and not consciousness. As such bondage cannot be established in consciousness.

(c) Simply on account of the objectivity of the false knowledge, it would be incorrect to accept bondage in consciousness. This is ascertained by an illustration of our normal experience in daily life. For instance, when people regard 'Mahatma Gandhi' as a very kind-hearted and noble person, he would not become cruel due to falsity of experience or some wrong information about him. An atheist does not believe in the existence of God, but God does not become non-existent for a believer orthodox simply by this (non-belief). If a blind person cannot see the light of Sun, this is not the fault of Sun. It is the visionary defect of an eye. Likewise, it is true that on account of ego the 'attributeless consciousness' is regarded as the locus of the activity but there could not be any defect in the consciousness on account of erroneous knowledge or false understanding. In the absence of any defect, bondage in consciousness remains out of question and all efforts towards liberation would be entirely useless.

In this context the point of view of Sāṁkhya philosophy appears to be more reasonable. According to the Sāṁkhya system the Self (Puruṣa) is unattached, pure consciousness and the permanent changeless. Bondage and liberation are in relation with causal matter (Prakṛti). Both remain out of question so far as pure consciousness is concerned. The outlook of Sāṁkhya is justified by the reasoning that matter is bound and that intellect exists in the state of bondage by its very nature and in the state of liberation in the causal form.[27] Bondage means a false unification of consciousness with matter, and liberation means it dissociation in Sāṁkhya. To accept bondage and liberation in consciousness is not a very sound proposition because in non-dualism consciousness is regarded as 'attributeless'. Neither bondage nor liberation could exist in the ego because the ego has no causal form in the state of liberation.

Testimony of the Upaniṣads

I now examine the testimony of the Chāndogya and the Kaṭha Upaniṣads along with the Bhāṣyas of Śaṅkarācārya and Rāmānujācārya on the concept of 'I-sense-Self' theory. Taking into consideration the 'Science of Unconditioned Supreme Self' (Bhūmā-vidyā)[28] as propounded in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, the Non-dualist establishes a difference between the 'I-sense' and the 'Self' and a non-difference between the 'I-sense' and the ego. The science has been explained in three stages in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad:

1. From 'sa eva adhastāt 7.25.1' to 'sa eva idaṁ sarvam', declaring the, unconditioned Supreme Self' as all pervading.
2. From 'atha ataḥ ahaṁkārādeśaḥ', to 'aham eva edaṁ sarvam' announcing the 'I-sense' of the nature of ego as all pervading. It is on this evidence that identity of 'I-sense' and ego has been interpreted by the followers of non-dualism.
3. From 'atha ataḥ Ātmādeśaḥ' to 'Ātvaiva adhastāt' to Ātmaiva idaṁ sarvam 7.25.2, stating 'Self' as all pervading.

The main argument of the Non-dualist against the 'I-sense-self' theory is that if 'I-sense' and 'Self' were identical the instruction of an ego (aham artha ādeśa) alone would be sufficient in the present context. The instruction of a 'Self' (Ātmādeśa) bears

testimony to the fact that an 'I-sense' and a 'Self' are not identical.

Let us carefully examine this Upaniṣadic evidence. It is clear from the study of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad that the 'unconditioned Supreme Self', 'I-sense' and 'Self' all three have independently been spoken of as all pervading. It would therefore be not correct to consider them different; or else on the basis of the same Upaniṣadic testimony and same logic the 'unconditioned Supreme Self' and the 'Self' would also be regarded as different, while even in non-dualism they are both regarded as identical in essence. If the identity of the 'unconditioned Supreme Self' and 'Self' is accepted in spite of their separately being pointed out in the text, the identity of 'I-sense' and 'Self' could not be denied.

A comparison of the Śāṅkara Bhāṣya and the Rāmānuja Bhāṣya on the Chāndogya Upaniṣad quoted above clarifies a number of points. I present below a brief comparative study of the two bhāṣyas for the ready reference of the readers.

The Śāṅkara Bhāṣya interprets the passage in question as follows: 'Verily that extends below, it extends from above, it extends from behind, it extends from before, it extends from south, it extends from north,—of a truth it is all this.'[29]

Śaṅkarācārya clearly states in his bhāṣya that the 'unconditioned Supreme Self' is meant by the word 'That', therefore, one might be confused that the 'Self' is different from the 'unconditioned Supreme Self'.[30] To avoid this confusion the Chāndogya Upaniṣad imparts the instruction of ego defined as egoistically in the following way: 'Verily I extend from below, I extend from above, I extend from behind, I extend from before, I extend from south, I extend from north,—of a truth I am all this'.[31]

The purport of the Śāṅkara-bhāṣya is very clear that the teaching of the instruction of ego is meant to prove the identity of the 'perceiver individual Self' and the 'unconditioned Supreme Self'. One should not therefore confuse this instruction of ego to prove the identity of the 'unconditioned Supreme Self' and the multitude of the body, mind, senses and vital airs as an ordinary man takes this multitude as 'I', and thereupon for want of discrimination regards the multitude as 'I-sense'. To avoid this confusion the Chāndogya Upaniṣad finally imparts the instruction of 'Self' defined as psychically: 'Verily, the 'Self' extends from below, the Self extends from above, the Self extends from behind,

the Self extends from before, the Self extends from south, the Self extends from north,—of a truth the Self is all this.'[32]

The final instruction obviously covers the pure and eternal 'Self'. The study of the Śāṅkara-bhāṣya reveals that the 'unconditioned Self' (Bhūman) indirectly described as 'That', the 'perceiver individual Self' or 'I-sense' directly described as 'I', and the 'Self' directly described as 'Self' all are one and the same. It is just to avoid any misunderstanding that the description is threefold. In no way can a difference between 'I-sense' and 'Self' be proved by an impartial review of the Chāndogya testimony. In the beginning of all these instructions we read, 'It extends below', 'I extend below', and 'The Self extends below'. Had the 'unconditioned Self', 'I-sense' and 'Self' been different, the all-pervasiveness of the three could not be rightly justified. The reasoning, that the separate instruction is to establish a difference between the 'I-sense' and the 'Self', is incongruous to the spirit of the Śāṅkara-bhāṣya.

According to the Rāmānuja-bhāṣya the 'unconditioned Supreme Self' is omniscient, and all the sentient and insentient objects of the universe exist in the form of the inner Self. One should meditate upon the 'unconditioned Supreme Inner Self' through the feeling of 'I', (aham buddhi), i.e. 'I am everywhere'. By meditating on the Supreme Self in this form of one's own individual inner Self through the feeling of 'I', one distinctly realises the difference between individual Self and the Supreme Self. The idea is elaborated by an illustration. When we say 'The jar is blue', we do not distinguish blue quality from the substance. The instruction of 'I-sense-ego' is thus to make an aspirant realize the separate existence of the 'Supreme Self' within himself. We should not forget that ego stands here for the feeling of 'I' and the instruction of ego means to denote that one should meditate upon the 'unconditioned Supreme Self' through the feeling of 'I'. The Sanskrit word 'ahaṁkāra' referred to in this context is derived from the root $\sqrt{}$Kṛ to do preceded by by the noun 'aham' with the suffix 'ghañ' in the sense of abstract idea, meaning the production of 'I-idea' known as ego.[33]

It may be recalled that the feeling of 'I' is produced only in relation to the individual Self. It is never produced in relation to the 'Supreme Self' because the 'Supreme Self' does not become the object of the feeling of 'I'. The testimony of the Chāndogya

Upaniṣad discussed above is a conclusive proof that the word 'aham' (I), denoting individual Self, stands for the individual inner Self. It is only through the individual inner Self that the Supreme Inner Self becomes realised. The 'Supreme Self' is thus the inner self of the individual self, and the 'Supreme Self' is meditated upon through the feeling of 'I' because He is the inner self of the individual Self. The instruction of the 'Self' is therefore meant to establish that the 'Supreme Self' is the inner Self of the individual Self, and that He becomes related through the feeling of 'I' alone. In this way according to Rāmānuja there is complete identification among the 'unconditioned Supreme Self', 'I-sense' and 'Self' and that all these three stand for one and the same Ultimate Reality.

The Kaṭha Upaniṣad states that 'Our senses have been created by God with a tendency to move outward. It is for this reason that man looks outside himself rather than inside. Rarely a wise man, who is desirous of immortal life, looks to his inner Self with his eye turned inwards'.[84] The Kaṭha Upaniṣad testifies that the realisation of the individual inner Self is the only means to attain liberation. This means is indirect while the realisation of the Supreme Self is the direct means of liberation.

Dr. S. Radhakrishnan has rightly concluded in the Principal Upaniṣads (London, 1933, pp. 93-94). 'There does not seem to be any suggestion that the individual egos are unreal. They all exist through the Self and have no reality apart from it. The insistence on the unity of the Supreme Self as the constituent reality of the world and of the individual souls does not negate the empirical reality of the latter.'

Meaning of Pratyak-Ātman and Parāk-Ātman

It would be most helpful to understand the doctrine of 'aham-artha' as identical with 'Self' if we interpret these two technical terms of Vedānta philosophy. Both these terms have been used by the followers of Advaita and Vaiṣṇava Vedānta alike. To begin with, let me recall that Pratyak-Ātman stands for Jiva-Ātman (individual Self) when we accept the compound 'karmadhāraya', while the same word stands for Paramātman (Supreme Self of the individual Self) if a 'tatpuruṣa' compound is accepted. Either compound interprets the word 'Pratyak' in the sense of the 'self'. Therefore, the 'pratyaktva' proves that 'Self' is 'I-sense'.

Pratyak means directed inwards. It stands for the individual inner 'Self'. Parāk means directed outwards or towards the outer world (as the senses). Pratyak is self-luminous and Parāk is illumined by another. The sense of Pratyak is obviously opposed to that of Parāk. In Advaita, cognition is regarded as self-luminous. Therefore, 'Self' of the nature of cognition is Pratyak Ātman. Parāk is explained as 'paraṁ prakāśakatayā añcati', signifying it as 'paraprakāśa', i.e. which is luminous by another. On the basis of this interpretation the Non-dualist again makes an attempt to deny the identity of 'I-sense' and 'Self'. It is therefore essential to re-examine the meaning of these two terms along the tradition of Vaiṣṇava Vedānta.

The Non-dualistic interpretation is rejected on the following grounds:

1. Pratyak would now be bracketed with pain, pleasure and desire because they are also self-luminous, so long they exist.
2. Cognition is regarded as a characteristic of 'I-sense'. As such, cognition is a 'dharma' (attribute or special characteristic mark) and 'I-sense' is a 'dharmin' (where the special characteristic or properties of having the nature reside). According to the above interpretation cognition is dependent. Therefore only the independent 'I-sense' would be regarded as the individual 'inner Self' and not the dependent cognition.
3. The Naiyāyika and the Vaiśeṣika totally reject any self-luminous entity. According to them 'Self' (Ātman) is known as 'inner Self' (Pratyak-Ātman). Neither of these sister schools of logic of Indian philosophy consider 'Self' as self-luminous.

The older Vaiṣṇava tradition interprets in the following way:

(a) Pratyak literally means going backwards or directed inwards (pratīpam añcati). It denotes the 'Self' existing inside the body, mind, intellect, ego and senses and controlling them together. Needless to say that all schools of Vedānta refer to 'Self' by the term 'Pratyak-Ātman'. Every human being has the mental perception of 'I' which denotes 'Self' and nothing else. The object of this shines of itself, i.e. illuminates itself and this very object is known as the 'Self'.[36] Furthermore, in case the

'I-sense' is different from 'Self', 'Self' will not be accepted as 'Pratyak' because it is only on account of Self arrogating thought that 'Pratyak' is distinguished from 'Parāk'.[37]

(b) 'Parāk' literally means directed towards the outer world as the senses. Any object, therefore, which attains another or is attained by another or illumines another is understood as 'Parāk' (Param añitca prāpnoti, parenopādīyate parasmai prakāśate). Parāk is therefore that which exists for another. All the objects of the universe such as jar etc. exist for 'I-sense'-Self' because their ultimate result goes to 'I-sense-Self'. Hence Parāk.[38]

Pratyagartha is obviously different from Parāgratha and Prayagartha and 'I' are identical, 'Jīva' is known as individual 'Self' or 'Ātman' when conditioned by a body, known as consciousness when it becomes a substratum of knowledge, and as Pratyak when there is feeling of 'I' due to attributive consciousness (dharmabhūta jñāna).[39] An individual inner Self marked as 'A' is not considered as Pratyak for another individual inner Self marked as 'B' because 'A' is not experienced as 'I' by 'B'. Therefore Pratyak is an object of the feeling of 'I'. This feeling of 'I' is not different from 'I-sense'.

This thesis of Vaiṣṇavism is fully supported by the Vaiśeṣika school of Indian philosophy.[40] The Vaiśeṣika Sūtras of Kaṇāda clearly indicate that the apprehension of feeling of 'I' is related to one's own individual inner 'Self' and that 'I' is never considered as the 'Self' of another individual being. We comprehend the idea of 'I' as related to one's own 'Self'. If the body was 'Self' and the object of 'I-apprehension' was body, the body of another being would also have been apprehended as 'I'. Such is not our experience in life. Therefore, the object of our 'I-apprehension' is something different from the body and that is 'Self'. 'I-apprehension' is always in connection with one's own individual 'Self'. The nature of the individual inner 'Self' is an object of one's own perception but the nature of the 'Self' of another being is only an object of inferential knowledge. The distinction among different individual 'Selves' is thus obvious.

A comparative study of the commentary of Śaṅkara Miśra, the gloss of Jayanārāyaṇa and the bhāṣya of Chandrakānta on the above referred Vaiśeṣika Sūtras of Kaṇāda makes it quite clear that since the intuitional apprehension 'I' arises in respect of one's own 'Self' and since it does not exist in respect of other

'Self' it is proper to regard one's own individual inner 'Self' as the primary reference. In case the primary reference were to the body, the intuitional apprehension should have been produced by external senses because the body is not an object of mental perception. The apprehension 'This is 'I' is mental because it is produced without the operation of external senses. The apprehension is neither inferential for want of logical reason, nor verbally communicated for want of authoritative text. It is further noteworthy that it refers to one's own individual 'Self' and not to the 'Self' of another for the 'Self' of one man remains beyond the senses of another man.[41]

In the prima facie view an objection is raised by the Non-dualist against his own point of view that 'the objects and their relative peculiar characteristics are superimposed on the individual inner Self', the substratum, on the simple logic that the substratum is never accepted as an object of knowledge. Unless one acquires the knowledge of substratum, the superimposition remains out of question. It may thus be explained that it is only after the knowledge of substratum that superimposition of silver on the conch-shell is experienced.[42] The prima facie view is rejected in the Śāṅkara-bhāṣya, wherein the individual inner 'Self' (Pratyak-Ātman) is not accepted as an absolute non-object of knowledge. Accordingly the individual inner 'Self' does become the object of intuitional apprehension of 'I'[43]. One does experience the idea of 'I-ness' in relation to the individual inner 'Self'. In case 'Self' was not an object of the apprehension of 'I' and was simply an object of the apprehension of conscience, we would have called the 'Self' as 'This' and not as 'I' because conscience being inanimate could only be designated by 'This' or 'That'.

A study of the Śāṅkara-bhāṣya shows that Pratyagartha and Parāgartha are two entirely different philosophical notions. Pratyagartha denotes the idea of 'I-ness' going towards the knower, while Parāgartha is always an object of the apprehension of 'This' or 'That'. There is no objectivity of 'I-apprehension' in relation to 'Pratyak-Ātman' and it is further to be kept in mind that the objectivity of 'I-apprehension' is always related to the objectivity of perception. Therefore, Pratyak-Ātman is definitely an object of 'I-apprehension'. To make it more comprehensive it is stated that we do acquire the knowledge of substratum which is none else but Pratyak-Ātman and there should be no hindrance

in accepting the superimposition of the objects and their special characteristic marks in Pratyak-Ātman. The Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya, on a close perusal, makes it clear that even Śaṅkarācārya has distinguished Parāgartha from Pratyagartha on the basis of 'I-intellect'. This attests that the idea of 'I-ness' is identical with the idea of individual inner 'Self' (i.e. Pratyak-Ātman).

Let us carefully examine the above-mentioned view of the non-dualism that not pure consciousness but consciousness conditioned by conscience is the object of 'I-apprehension'. Suffice to say that conscience as a limiting adjunct is an object of 'This-apprehension'. As such in the consciousness which is distinguished by the limiting adjunct, the 'I-apprehension' automatically steps in. If 'Self' is not accepted as an object of 'I-apprehension', the 'I-apprehension' would have no scope at all (nirviṣaya). It is needless to say that the objectivity of 'I-apprehension' is not acceptable even to Non-dualist. It is therefore a demand of propriety that the 'Self' of the nature of consciousness should be accepted as an object of 'I-apprehension' which is not different from the idea of 'I-ness'.

We have already seen that there is some basic difference between Non-dualist and Vaiṣṇava points of views. The Non-dualist maintains that the idea of 'Self' exists in 'I-apprehension' and it is only due to this fact that the 'Self' is recognised as perceptible, but the Non-dualist is not prepared to accept that in this 'I-apprehension' exists an imposition of 'I-ness' of conscience. Suffice to enquire that when the Non-dualist accepts the idea of 'Self' in 'I-apprehension', why not accept the 'Self' as the 'I-sense' instead of travelling through the imposition of 'I-sense' on 'Self'. Our experience becomes quite normal just by accepting the identity of 'I-sense' and 'Self'. Moreover, in the case of the imposition such as the crystal and the red flower, the redness of the flower is reflected on the crystal. The flower appears red apart from the crystal and the crystal appears red in the close proximity of the flower. It therefore becomes acceptable that the redness of the flower is reflected on the crystal. Such is not the condition between 'I-sense' of conscience and 'Self' because conscience never appears as 'I' apart from 'Self'. Hence the identity of the 'I-sense' and the 'Self'.

In case the 'I-sense' resides in the 'Self' as an attribute of ego, an aspect of consciousness as generally accepted by Non-dualist,

one may question what is the locus of 'I-ness' in relation to God (Īśvara) as described in the Upaniṣadic tradition.[44] 'I-sense' could certainly be accepted as an attribute of conscience and ego when God is conceived as consciousness conditioned by conscience or as consciousness conditioned by an ego; but it is a known fact that in Advaita Vedānta God is regarded as consciousness conditioned by Māyā.[45] It may be kept in mind that there is no idea of 'I-ness' in the state of Māyā. Truly, ego remains non-existent prior to godly supreme determination such as 'I wish to be many' and ego is produced only after the creation of the principle of intelligence (mahat), the first evolution according to Sāṁkhya philosophy.[46]

We are now left with no other alternative but to accept that 'I-ness' in God is not to be imposed from outside but that it belongs to God from within. This enables us to maintain that ego, a modification of causal matter (Prakṛti) is not 'I-sense' but 'Self' is 'I-sense'. Besides, 'I-intellect' is God as evidenced by the Upaniṣadic tradition.[47] This very knowledge is regarded as the righ knowledge because misapprehension of any sort is impossible in omniscient God. Therefore, 'I-ness' as described in God could not be an imposed one. By accepting an imposition of the 'I-ness' on God, one indirectly accepts the existence of misapprehension in God. On account of the non-existence of ego at the time of godly supreme determination and on account of the non-existence of ego in God, the apparent 'I-ness' in God has got to be accepted as belonging to the misapprehension of God.

I should further elucidate the Advaita point of view. The Non-dualist explains that in the intuitional apprehension of 'I' the united ego and consciousness appear as the basis of the mutual identical superimposition. I have already explained in detail the notion of the uniting element of animate and inanimate accepted as the 'I-sense' in non-dualism. Now it would be interesting to examine the Cārvāka point of view in this regard. It is a well-known fact that all the six orthodox system of Indian philosophy refute the 'body-Self' concept of Cārvāka and all of them unanimously agree that body is neither 'I-sense' nor consciousness. Therefore, it is not very scholarly to declare the body as 'Self'. In the false identification of 'Self' with the body, as the Cārvāka maintains, he has to accept 'I-intellect' in the body and therein

appears the identification of a body with the ego and consciousness. The 'Self' of the nature of consciousness appears identical with the body due to false knowledge.

The Non-dualist attacks against the Cārvāka on the ground that first and foremost we should not forget that the 'Self' of the nature of consciousness appears as 'I' due to false identity with conscience. Therefore, this very 'I' getting identical with the body appears as 'I am handsome', 'I am ugly', 'I am fat', 'I am of dark complexion'. This kind of apprehension is known as false identification with the body. To eradicate this wrong notion, the Non-dualist has first to establish difference between 'I-sense' and the body and then has to remove the misapprehension of non-difference between ego and consciousness and finally has to establish non-identity of 'Self' and ego.

It has already been observed that 'I-sense' does not mean the uniting element of animate and inanimate but it is 'Self' itself. The false identification with the body is not very different from the misapprehension of non-difference between 'I-sense' and 'non-Self' (anātman): No misapprehension can logically be established at the root of the false identification with the body as indirectly advocated by the Non-dualist in the form of misapprehension between consciousness and ego. Furthermore, the celebrated writer of the Iṣṭasiddhi accepts the object illuminating knowledge as objectless or having no scope and without any substratum. He declares that this very knowledge is the principal characteristic of the 'Self'. The object illuminating knowledge appears as an attribute of 'I-sense' on the basis of the apprehension, 'I know'. The difference between 'I-sense' and knowledge as characteristic (dharma) and as that which possess the characteristic (dharmin) is obvious. The misapprehension of non-difference between 'attributeless Self' and 'I-sense' is an impossibility.

I have already mentioned that the Non-dualist interprets the word 'aham' (I) as conscience when there is false identification with the ego and superimposition of the ego as consciousness conditoned by conscience when there is false identification with the body. This involves a defect, because there is only one meaning of 'I-sense' and that meaning is 'Self'.

Upavarṣa and Vedāntadeśika

Upavarṣa, a pre-Śaṅkara author of several writings on

Mīmāṁsā philosophy and his followers accept complete identity of 'I-sense' and 'Self'. They clearly propound that the 'Self' is an object of 'I-apprehension'. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (9th century), one of the most celebrated logicians of the old school of Hindu logic clearly refers to the tradition of Upavarṣa in his Nyāya-mañjarī, and of the followers of Upavarṣa who directly realised the 'Self' as an object of the feeling of 'I-apprehension'. Some scholars hold that this Upavarṣa was none else but Baudhāyana. We are still not in a position to accept this view for want of valid evidence. In my opinion this Upavarṣa was the younger brother of Varṣa, the teacher of Pāṇini, the most celebrated Indian grammarian. Evidently by the time of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa the tradition of Upavarṣa occupied a prominent place in ancient Indian philosophical thought. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa clearly states that Upavarṣa and his followers of the Pūrva Mīmāṁsā accept complete identification of 'I-sense' and 'Self'.[48]

The 'I-sense-Self' theory has a support in the course of the long history of Indian philosophy. It has been supported by the Cārvāka, Bauddha,[49] Naiyāyika, Vaiśeṣika, Pūrva Mīmāṁsaka and Vaiṣṇava Ācāryas with special reference to Rāmānuja school of Vedānta. The evidences from Yāmunācārya and Vedānta-Deśika produce ample testimony in favour of this theory.

Yāmunācārya maintains that it is proved beyond doubt by logic and verbal testimony that 'Self' and 'I-sense' are identical and that the 'Self' is knower.[49] The two statements 'I know' and 'I do not know' indicate the existence of knowledge and ignorance in 'I-cognition' in relation to the difference of time. This is our normal experience that by the rise of a particular knowledge in 'I-cognition' the previous ignorance is dispelled. The 'Self' misapprehends itself as body in the apprehension, 'I am fat', 'I am weak'. This is certainly nescience in the form of false apprehension with the body. Nescience is possible only when we accept 'I-ness' and 'knowerness' (jñātṛttva) in the 'Self'. In the absence of 'I-ness' and 'knowerness' in the 'Self' the false identification with the body remains an impossibility. Hence knower Self-'I-sense'.[50]

In fine, I put forward the conclusive evidence from Vedānta-deśika, the well-known great Guru (mahādeśika) who has fully supported the 'I-sense-Self' theory on the basis of the following arguments:

प्रत्यक्त्वादुपलम्भतो मम सुखं भावीति मोक्षेच्छया
मुक्तब्रह्ममुमुक्षुवेदवचसा सुप्तोऽहमित्युक्तितः ।
मां नाज्ञासिषमित्यपि स्ववपुराद्यज्ञानमात्राश्रयात्
स्वापप्राच्यनिजक्रियास्मरणतोऽप्यात्माहमर्थः स्थिरः ॥

1. 'Self' (Ātman) is the individual inner Self (Pratyak) and non-Self is 'Parāk'. The nature of individual inner 'Self' is self-luminous, while 'Parāk' illumines another or illumines for another. Pratyak is connected with the idea of 'I' and Parāk to an object denoted by 'This' and 'That'. 'I-sense' exists for itself and the objects exist for the benefit of 'I-sense'. Therefore, 'I-sense' is 'Self'.
2. The 'Self' is regarded as eternal, animate and knower.[51] Our normal experience is as follows: 'I am the knower'.[52] This attests that wherever 'I-ness' and 'knowerness' exist, the conscious 'I-sense-Self' also exists.
3. The philosophical thinking maintains that the 'Self' experiences the miseries of the mundane world and desires to attain liberation in order to get rid of the cycle of birth and death. Such an intensive desire impels 'Self' to follow the means of liberation. The experience of miseries, the desire to get rid of them and the desire to enjoy the inexhaustible bliss in the state of liberation could belong to 'I-sense' alone.
4. Here are five questions from the Vedic literature. They are ascribed to liberated persons, the Supreme Self, and persons desirous of liberation. Vedāntadeśika attaches primary importance to the authority of the Vedic testimony in support of the theory of 'I-sense-Self'.

   (a) 'I am food (Taittirīya Upaniṣad III.13.6). This is a statement of a liberated person.
   (b) 'I became Manu' (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 1.4.10). A statement of Vāmadeva who is regarded as a liberated person while alive.
   (c) 'I enter in all in the form of life.'[53] A statement of Supreme Self.
   (d) 'I go for refuge to all-Effulgent Self.'[54] A statement of one who is desirous of liberation.
   (e) 'I was alone in the beginning' (ahamekaḥ prathama-

māsam) Atharvaveda. Vedic testimony. All the above quoted citations testify identity of 'I-sense' and 'Self'.

5. We know by now that according to Advaita Vedanta the gross ego is the 'I-sense' and it is destroyed in the state of profound repose. Our experience is however different. It tells us when awaking from profound repose that one slept so long happily but did not know anything. Hence the existence of 'I-sense' in profound repose. Only 'I-sense' existent in profound repose could be Self and nothing else. According to non-dualism, conscience does exist in profound repose. In the case where conscience is the 'I-sense', one should have the apprehension 'I was non-existent during profound repose'. Since such is never our experience, it follows that 'I-sense' is 'Self'.
6. In the tradition of Advaita Vedānta, the 'Self' is regarded as self-luminous (svayaṁprakāśa) and eternal. As such, the 'Self' continues to illumine and exist in profound repose. In the case where the 'I-sense' is the 'Self' argues the Non-dualist, the 'I-sense' should have been existent in profound repose. Nevertheless, such is not the case because the 'Self' in profound repose does not remain aware of 'I'. Therefore, self-luminous 'Self' is not 'I-sense'. Besides, awaking from profound repose it tells us that one had no awareness even of oneself. Such an experience establishes negation of 'I-sense' in the state of profound repose. The non-existence of 'I-sense' and self-luminous Self in the state of profound repose are two entirely different concepts Vedānta and they are not identical, maintains the Non-

st.

basi-w of Advaita Vedānta does not hold good on the
inner · (1) The 'I-sense-Self' illumines itself in the
inherent dream, profound repose and swoon, on the
sense-Self such as oneness, the state of individual
account of unhappiness (2) The illumination pertains to the
During the state 'I-sense'. Thus the self-luminous 'I-
e of awaking, and dream on
ledge, desire, happiness and
ss (dharma-bhūta jñāna).
'Self' does not illumine

by attributive consciousness but by its own nature. The attributive consciousness, over-powered by tamas, becomes contracted during profound repose. Truly, the 'I-sense-Self' being endowed with the attributes oneness, the state of individual inner 'Self' and concord illumines by its own nature during profound repose but does not remember the various attributes of name, form, varṇa and Āśrama such as a Brāhmaṇa, a Sannyāsin on the simple ground that the attributive consciousness remains hidden. The meaning of the statement 'I had no awareness even of myself' is as follows: I had no similar awareness of myself during profound repose as I always have during the state of awaking. As I understand myself as a brāhmaṇa, or as a sannyāsin or a Professor or an Ambassador during awaking on the basis of outer attributes. I had no memory of any such attribute during profound repose. In this way, the objection of the Non-dualist against the existence and illumination of 'I-sense' during profound repose and against the identity of 'I-sense' and 'Self' is clearly rejected.

I therefore conclude that the 'I-sense' and the 'Self' are identical. The 'I-sense' is not the non-self as maintained by the Non-dualist. The 'I-sense' exists in the dreamless profound sleep. In the state of liberation, the 'I-sense', abandoning all undesirable wordly forms, names, shapes and attributes exists in its pure form and as such 'I-sense' is properly entitled to study the scriptures, the best means of liberation. The identity of 'I-sense' and 'Self' may therefore be tacitily accepted.

References

1. Iśvarakṛṣṇa, Sāṁkhya-Kārikā, 25.

2. The Ātman-Puruṣa of Sāṁkhya is in reality 'Nirguṇa'. This view of Sāṁkhya is evident from the Mādhyamakāvatāra VI, 121 quoted in the Prasannapadā commentary of Chandrakirti on Nāgārjuna's (Mūla) Mādhyamakakārikā; cf. Murti, T.R.V., The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, London, 1955, p. 203.

3. The problem of Self and non-Self in Hindu and Buddhist tradition has never ceased to interest researchers, cf. Guha Abhyankumar, 'Jivātman in the Brahmasūtra', Calcutta, 1921; Mrs. Rhys Davids, 'The Birth of Indian Psychology and its Development in Buddhism', London, 1936; Narahari, H.G., 'Ātman in pre-Upaniṣadic Vedic Literature', Madras, 1944; Gonda, J. 'Notes on Brahman', Utrecht, 1950; Lacombe, O. 'La Direction Spirituelle selon les tradition indiennes, dans Direction spirituelle et Psychologie', (Etudes Carmilitaries) Bruges, 1951; Biardeau Madeline, 'La Philosophie de Maṇḍana

Miśra vue a partir de la Brahma-Siddhi, Paris, 1969; L'Ātman-Brahman dans le Buddhism Ancien, Bhaṭṭācharya Kamaleswar, Paris, 1973.

4. Sengupta Ahima, 'The Evolution of the Sāṁkhya School of Thought', 1959, Patna, pp. 70-80.

5. Brahmasūtra 2.4.12 (ed) Sivanand Saraswati, Rishikesh, 1949, pp. 523-24.

6. Joshi Rasik Vihari, 'The Role of Indian Logic in the Doctrine of Causality', Melanges d'Indianisme a la Memoire de Louis Renou, Paris, 1968, pp. 403-08.

7. Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad IV.3.22.

8. Śāṅkara Bhāṣya on the Brahmasūtra II.2.29. (ed.) Saraswati Satyananda, Varanasi, Samvat 2028, pp. 508-10.

9. Ibid., II.3.30.

10. Ibid., II.3.31, p. 512.

11. Ibid., II.3.32. 'Nityopalabdyanupalabdhiprasaṅgaḥ anyataraniyamo vānyathā.'

12. Tripathi, Manassukharama Suryarama, 'A Sketch of the Vedanta Philosophy', Bombay, 1910, p. 140.

13. Lacombe, O. 'L' Absolu selon le Vedanta', Guenther, Paris, 1937, pp. 28-35; op. cit. Tripathi Manassukharama, Suryarama, 'Śāṅkara Vedanta interprets the Vedanta unity by harmony between Egotism and Altruism', pp. 126-32.

14. (a) La Kaśikā-Vṛtti, (ed.) Yutaka Ojihara et Louis Renou, Paris, 1960-67.
    (b) Tattva-muktā-kalāpa of Vedāntadeśika, (Bhāvaprakāśa pp. 40-41) Vol. II. (ed.) S. Narasimhachar, Mysore, 1940.

15. Manobuddhirahaṁkāraścittam karaṇamantaram,
    sanśayo niścayo garvaḥ smaraṇam viṣayā ime/
    Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya on Brahmasūtra, Op.Cit. Satyanand Saraswati, p. 544.

16. avidyātmikā hi bījaśaktiḥ avyaktaśabdanirdeśyā
    Parameśvarāśrayā māyāmayī mahāsuṣuptiḥ/
    Śāṅkara Bhāṣya on the Brahmasūtra (ed.) Saraswati Satyanand, Varanasi, Samvat 2028, pp. 287-88.

17. 'Even in the state of dreamless sleep, though there is no consciousness of objects, still the sense of 'I' (ahamartha) persists.'
    The Vedanta, Ghate, V.S., Poona, 1960, p. 25.

18. The Twelve Principal Upaniṣads (Chāndogya Upaniṣad (13.1) (ed.) Mitra and Cowell, Vol. III, p. 274.

19. Op. Cit., Ibid., p. 274.

20. Cf. Mitra and Cowell, Taittiriya Upaniṣad, 3.30, pp. 231-32; Ranade, R.D., A Constructive Survey of Upanisadic Philosophy, Bombay, 1967 p. 257.

21. ahamartha-vināśaścen mokṣa ityadhivasyati,
    apasarpedasau mokṣakathāprastāvagandhataḥ/
    Śrībhāṣya p. 67 (ed.) Annangaracharya, Kanchipuram, 1956.

22. 'ahamityeva hi tasya svarūpam' Śrī Yāmunāchārya's Siddhitraya (Ātmasiddhi p. 39) (ed.) Rāmānujāchārya, Madras, 1972.

23. "........the mundane is itself the transmundane and the transmundane

it itself the mundane." Venkata Ramanan, Nāgārjuna's Philosophy as Presented in the Mahā-Prajñā-Pāramitā-Śāstra, Tokyo, 1966, p. 122.

24. Tameva viditvātimṛtyumeti nānyaḥ panthāḥ vidyāte 'nayāya/ Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, (ed.) Swami Tyagishvaranand, Madras, 1957, pp. 70-71.

25. Brahmavid Brahmaiva bhavati/Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad 3.2.9.

26. Cf. op. cit., Mitra and Cowell, (Chāndogya Upaniṣad) Vol. III, pp. 247-48.

27. Sāṁkhya-Kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa 62 and 63; cf. Mukerji, J.N., The Theory of Reality, Calcutta, 1930, pp. 60-64, 97-98; Sengupta Anima, 'The Evolution of the Sāṁkhya School of Thought', Patna, 1959, pp. 49-51.

28. 'It is Sanatkumāra who teaches the doctrine of Bhūman. Bhūman is that infinite happiness which arises by the vision of the divinity all around. A Constructive Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy, Ranade, R.D., Bombay, 1968, p. 37.

29. Chāndogya Upaniṣad VII.25.1, op. cit., The Twelve Principal Upaniṣads, (ed.) Rajendralal Mitra and E.B. Cowell, Madras, 1932, Vol. III, p. 245.

30. Chāndogya Upaniṣad, Śaṅkarācārya-granthāvali, Delhi, 1964, pp. 296-97. As regards the 'neti neti prakriyā' of Advaita Vedanta, Mrs. Rhys Davids has observed, 'this is as if one were to come abored asking for the cáptain and rejecting boatswain and purser as being 'not he' were to go away saying 'there is no captain'. 'The Self' : an over looked Buddhist Simile, JRAS, 1937, p. 260.

31. op. cit. Chāndogya...pp. 245-46; Cf. Tattva-muktākalāpa' of Vedāntadeśika (Bhāvaprakāśa pp. 230-31) (ed.) S. Narasimhachar, Mysore, Vol. II, 1940.

32. op. cit., Chāndogya... p. 246.

33. ahaṁkaraṇam ahamkāraḥ.

34. Kaṭha Upaniṣad II.4.1; cf. Ranade, A Constructive Survey of Upanisadic Philosophy, p. 247.

35. Finite Self (Ramanujist Idea of Self) (ed.) Bon Maharaj, Vrindaban, 1963, pp. 14-20.

36. 'svasmati prakāśamānatvarūpam pratyaktvam', Śribhāṣya, Sūtraprakāśikā, p. 94; op.cit. Finite Self, pp. 14-15.

37. 'ahamartho na cedātma pratyaktvam nātmanām bhavet, ahambudhyā parāgarthāt pratyagartho hi bhidhyate/ Śrībhāṣya, p. 67 (ed.) Annangaracarya, Kancipuram, 1956. 'sa sādhanānuṣṭhānena yadyahameva na bhaviṣyāmi ityavagacchet, apasarpedevasau mokṣakathāprastāvāt; tataśca adhikārivirahādeva sarvam mokṣaśāstram apramāṇam syāt/Ibid., p. 71.

Cf. Yāmunācārya's Siddhitraya (Ātmasiddhi, p. 39) (ed.) Ramanujacharya, Madras, 1972.

38. Tattavmuktākalāpa of Vedāntadeśika (Sarvārthasiddhi, Ānandadāyinī and Bhāvaprakāśa commentaries on verses Nos. 6 and 7 of the Jivasara chapter) (ed.) S. Narasimhachar, Mysore, 1940, Vol. II, pp. 208-69.

39. Śāriraka-mīmāṁsā-bhāṣya, 1.1.1 (Rāmānujagranthamālā) (ed.) Annangaracharya, Kanchipuram, 1956, p. 67.

40. 'ahamiti pratyagātmani bhāvāt paratvābhāvāt arthāntarapratyakṣaḥ/

The Vaiśeṣika Sūtras of Kaṇāda, III.2.14 (ed.) Basu B.D. and Sinha Nandlal, Allahabad, 1923.

41. Ibid., Basu and Sinha, pp. 124-25.

42. Joshi, Rasik Vihari, Validity of Knowledge in Indian Logic, Dr. V. Raghavan Felicitation Volume, Delhi, 1975, pp. 180-86.

43. 'na tāvadayam ekāntena aviṣayaḥ, asmatpratītiviṣayatvāt aparoṣkatvācca pratyagātmasiddheḥ'
Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya (ed.) Mahamahopadhyaya Anantakrishna Shastri, Bombay, 1938.

44. 'He (the Supreme Soul) desired: Let me become many, let me be born.' Taittirīya Upaniṣad II.6.2.

45. 'It's infinitesimal part becomes the qualified Brahman, through its association with the unreal principle of Māyā.' Tripathi, Manassukhram Suryarama; 'A Sketch of the Philosophy of Vedanta', Bombay, 1901, p. 73.

46. Sāṁkhya-kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, 22.

47. Chāndogya Upaniṣad, VI.3.2; 'Eighteen Principal Upanishads', (ed.) Limaye V.P. and Vadekar R.D., Poona, 1968.

48. 'Tatra pratyakṣa-mātmānam Aupavarṣāḥ Prapedire,
aham-pratyayagamyattvāt svayūthya api kecana/
Nyāyamañjarī of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, (ed.) Madhvacharya Adya, Varanasi, 1969, Vol. II, p. 3.

49. "....one can say that the one accepts or denies Ātman as much as the other, both the Mādhyamaka and the Advaita Vedanta deny Ātman as a separate substantial entity inhabiting the body of each individual, and both accept Ātman in the sense of essential nature of the individual as well as of all things..., ātman brahman means there is hardly any difference between the two." K. Venkata Ramanam, Nagarjuna's philosophy as presented in Mahā-Prajñā-Pāramitā-śāstra, Rutland-Tokyo, 1966, p. 320.

50. Ataḥ pratyakṣa-siddhattvāt ukta-nyāyāgamānvayāt, avidyāyogataścātmā jñātāhamiti bhāsate/ The Siddhitraya of Yāmunācārya, (ed.) Ramanujacharya, Madras, (Ātmasiddhi, pp. 41-44), 1972.

51. 'Vedānta-deśika very clearly accepts in the Adhikaraṇasārāvali that the individual inner 'Self, (Pratyak) is 'I-sense'. (Pratyaññātmāhamarthaḥ), Adhikaraṇasārāvali, p. 240 (ed.) Annangaracharya, Kanchivaram, 1940; cf. atohamartho jñātaiva pratyagātmeti niścitam', Śrībhāṣya, p. 67 (ed.) Op.Cit., 1956.

52. 'He is eternal among the eternals and intelligent among all that are intelligent.' Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad. (ed.) Swami Tyagishwaranand, Madras, 1957 (II.6.13)

53. 'entering these objects in the form of life (Self) I shall be manifest in various names and forms.' Chāngogya Upaniṣad, VI.3.2.

54. '.....seeking liberation I go for refuge to the Effulgent one, who turns the understanding Ātman.' Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, VI.18.

CONTRIBUTORS

Prof. ANDRÉ BAREAU who was born 1921 near Paris, retired as Professor of Study of Buddhism at the Collège de France. He has published several works and numerous articles and monographs on Indian Buddhism, especially on the Buddha's biography, the history and doctrines of the ancient schools of the so-called Hīnayāna (*Les sectes bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule*, etc.).

Prof. KAMALESWAR BHATTACHARYA Docteur ès Letters (Paris), Directeur de Recherche (1st class) at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris, was formerly Visiting Professor, University of Toronto (Canada), etc. He has published: *Les Religions brahmaniques dans l'ancien Cambodge* (1961); *Recherches sur le vocabulaire des inscriptions sanskrites du Cambodge* (1964; 2nd edn., 1991); *L'Ātman-Brahman dans le Bouddhisme ancien* (1973); *The Dialectical Method of Nāgārjuna* (Vigrahavyāvartanī) (1978; 3rd edn., 1990); *Le Siddhāntalakṣaṇaprakaraṇa du Tattvacintāmaṇi de Gaṅgeśa avec; Le Dīdhiti de Raghunātha Śiromaṇi et la Ṭīkā de Jagadīśa Tarkālaṃkāra* (*Journal Asiatique*, 1977—), and numerous articles on various topics of Indology, in French, English and Sanskrit.

DR. BHAGWAN DASH is holder of Post-graduate qualifications in Āyurveda and Sanskrit, and Doctorate degree in Tibetan Medicine. He was Deputy Adviser in Āyurveda to the Govt. of India in the Ministry of Health. In 1980, he took voluntary retirement from his Government job to pursue his Āyurvedic practice and carry out researches in Āyurveda and Tibetan medicine on both of which he has already written 45 books.

Prof. COLLETT COX is Associate Professor in the Department of Asian Languages and Literature at the University of Washington. Her field of research is Indian Buddhist Abhidharma and her recent work includes publications on Buddhist epistemology, religious praxis, soteriology, and hermeneutics. She is the author of *Disputed Dharmas: Early Buddhist Theories on Existence*.